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Abstract: This study aims to investigate the effect of management compensation to tax 
avoidance. However, prior research has offered no consistent conclusions on the 
relationship between management compensation and tax avoidance. This study also 
tests whether family-firm ownership attempt to decrease the negative effect of 
management compensation and tax avoidance. Using a sample of Indonesian listed 
firms during period 2011-2014, the empirical evidence suggests management 
compensation is negatively affected to tax avoidance. This result consistent with 
Armstrong et al. (2012) that management was decreasing in incentives to do tax 
avoidance if there is high management compensation. Also, the family firm's 
ownership could reduce the negative effect of management compensation for tax 
avoidance. It shows that family firms in Indonesia tend to do tax avoidance although 
management has high contract compensation.  
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Abstract: Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk mengetahui pengaruh kompensasi manajemen 
terhadap penghindaran pajak. Namun, penelitian sebelumnya tidak menawarkan 
kesimpulan yang konsisten tentang hubungan antara kompensasi manajemen dan 
penghindaran pajak. Penelitian ini juga menguji apakah usaha kepemilikan keluarga-
perusahaan untuk mengurangi efek negatif dari kompensasi manajemen dan 
penghindaran pajak. Menggunakan sampel perusahaan yang terdaftar di Indonesia 
selama periode 2011-2014, bukti empiris menunjukkan kompensasi manajemen 
terpengaruh secara negatif terhadap penghindaran pajak. Hasil ini konsisten dengan 
Armstrong et al. (2012) bahwa manajemen mengalami penurunan insentif untuk 
melakukan penghindaran pajak jika ada kompensasi manajemen yang tinggi. Juga, 
kepemilikan perusahaan keluarga dapat mengurangi efek negatif dari kompensasi 
manajemen untuk menghindari pajak. Ini menunjukkan bahwa perusahaan keluarga 
di Indonesia cenderung melakukan penghindaran pajak meskipun manajemen 
memiliki kompensasi kontrak yang tinggi. 
 
Keywords:  Penghindaran Pajak, Kompensasi Manajemen, Kepemilikan Keluarga 
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1. Introduction 
Prior research shows that there is a positive relationship between management 
compensation and tax avoidance (Armstrong et al.,2015; Armstrong et al.,2012; 
Minnick and Noga, 2010). Based on the perspective of agency theory, tax avoidance 
reflects the opportunistic management to reduce the tax burden to increase corporate 
profits that influence their compensation (Desai and Dharmapala, 2006). However, in 
contrast to prior research such as Robinson et al. (2010) and Armstrong et al. (2012) 
found a negative relationship between compensation and tax avoidance. Armstrong et 
al., (2012) shows that negative effect between compensation and tax avoidance.  
Besides, several studies also assert that family ownership can affect a firm's 
decision on tax avoidance. Chen et al. (2010) argue that there is a different level of tax 
avoidance, family firms will have a lower level of tax avoidance compared to non-
family firms. Chen et al. (2010) showed that family-owned firms would prefer to pay 
higher taxes rather than receive a bad reputation if they caught in illegal tax avoidance 
cases. However, family firms in Indonesia tend more aggressive action to do tax 
avoidance because of its worse organizational structure and low market reaction (Sari, 
2010). Furthermore, the majority of listed companies in Indonesia are family-owned 
which certainly is unique in considering tax avoidance. 
Claessens et al. (2000) argue that most of the firms in the East Asia Region 
including Indonesia have a family-owned and concentrated ownership structure. 
Besides, there are still practices of crony capitalism in Indonesia, such as Salim 
Group, Raja Garuda (Tanoto Sukanto / Asian Agri Group), and companies owned by 
the Cendana family (Soeharto). This will certainly impact the differences in corporate 
behavior in tax avoidance (Claessens et al., 2000). Wang (2006) found that family-
owned companies have more reliable financial reporting qualities than if the family 
did not own them. However, some cases in Indonesia shows just the opposite that 
family firms more tax avoidance, so that it can be said that the financial statements 
more untrustworthy than companies that are not family owned. This suggests that 
Wang's (2006) findings are inconsistent with the facts occurring today especially in 
the context of companies in Indonesia. 
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This research provides some contribution. First, prove the empirical evidence that 
family firms are associated with management compensation to tax avoidance in a 
country that has majority family-owned firms like Indonesia. Second, modifyingproxy 
for family ownerships as measurementrefers to Wang (2006) by using dummy 
variable. Third, using a proxy for tax avoidance measured by book-tax differences 
refers to Tang and Firth (2008) to test the relationship between management 
compensation and tax avoidance. 
The remainder of the study proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides literature and 
the development of hypotheses. Section 3 introduces research methods and describes 
the samples. Section 4 describes the results of research. Section 5 is the conclusion of 
this study. 
 
2. Theoretical Framework and Development Hypothesis 
2.1 Compensation management and tax avoidance 
Following recent academic studies on tax avoidance, there are pros and cons 
regarding the impact of tax avoidance activity. Prior research shows that tax avoidance 
can provide benefits through corporate tax savings by reducing the risk of bank 
defaults and lowering borrowing costs (Mills, 1998; Graham and Tucker, 2006). 
However, another opinion stated that there is a negative impact of tax avoidance that 
may expose some risk to the firm which increasing the agency risk and the risk of tax 
audits (Mills 1998; Desai and Dharmapala, 2006; Balakrishnan et al., 2012). 
Hasan et al. (2013) indicate that there are two stakeholders perspective in 
responding to tax avoidance. First, lenders (debt holders) may respond to avoidance 
negatively by the firm because risky to the firm’s future and the possibility of default 
(increasing risk exposure). Second, the shareholder's perspective actually responds 
positively because it can increase the firm’s profit which in turn will give benefit to 
shareholders (increasing benefit). 
Tax avoidance can create a conflict of interest between two parties better known 
as agency issues (Masri and Martani, 2012). Management as an agent wants a bonus 
for income performance so that management tends to be opportunistic for tax 
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avoidance, while the owners want the sustainability of the firm's future. So that 
owners give some contract compensation to management to reduce the opportunistic 
management through tax avoidance activities. 
Ozkan (2011) and Croci et al. (2012) argue that providing optimal compensation 
to the management can reduce agency problems within the firm, so it can be used as a 
mechanism to reduce the opportunistic management in tax avoidance. Also, Morck 
and Yeung (2003) state that from the perspective of agency theory, management tends 
to make decisions that could harm a firm's future sustainability. Therefore, optimal 
management compensation is needed to improve the management’s performance 
(Chalmer et al., 2006) 
Robinson et al. (2010) and Armstrong et al. (2012) also arguethat there is a 
negative effect between management compensation and tax avoidance. When a firm 
conducts aggressive tax avoidance, it will increase the uncertainty and risky for the 
firms against the law (Murphy, 2004). Therefore, it can be presumed that the owner 
considers tax avoidance is risky for the firm’s future so that the owner will provide 
some compensation to management in the hope that they are not opportunistic in tax 
avoidance. 
H1. Compensation management has negative effect to corporate tax avoidance 
  
2.2 Family ownership on management compensation to tax avoidance 
Also, especially in Indonesia with majority family-owned firms, the impact of 
compensation will certainly be different because there is uniqueness on family firms.  
Arifin (2003) argue that the firm’s family ownership in Indonesia is less of an agency 
problem compared to the dispersed ownership firms. Chen et al. (2010) provide that 
usually the board of family firms is actually controlled by family members of the 
firms. The interests of the firms are more centered on the interests of the owner 
because the owner will mostly feel basically the profits and risks of the company. 
According to Anderson and Reeb (2003) provide that owners of family firms have a 
strong influence on long-term firms future because the owner is more focused to pass 
on to his offspring. 
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Wang (2006) indicated that the family firms would put family members in a 
strategic position of the firms to control the discretion and strategic decision of the 
firm. This research provides a new understanding through the definition of family 
ownership represented by the founding family representative on the board of directors 
or puts these representatives as chief executive (CEO’s) of the company. 
Family firms have better control and adverse tax avoidance when compared to 
firms whose nonfamily ownerships. Because family firms tend to choose to maintain 
reputations and avoid legal risks for tax breaches (Baderther et al., 2013). So that the 
relationship with the provision of compensation to management in the family 
company is also expected to reduce the opportunistic behavior of tax avoidance that 
can threaten the company's reputation (Robinson et al., 2010; Armstrong et al., 2012). 
Based on the literature review above can be said that if the company is family 
ownership indicated by a representative of the founding family as the company's chief 
executive (CEO), it can strengthen the negative influence of management 
compensation to tax avoidance. 
H2. If there is a representative of the founding family as the CEO of the firm, it 
strengthens the negative effect of management compensation to tax avoidance 
compared to firms that do not have a representative of the founding family as the 
CEO 
 
3. Research Method 
3.1 Sample Selection 
The research sample consisted of manufacturing firms listed in Indonesian Stock 
Exchange (IDX) from 2011 to 2014 period with a total of 268 firm-year observations. 
The reason for using the sample at that time, because of SFAS 7 about the disclosure 
of the compensation commissioner and directors was implemented in 2011in 
Indonesia. Also, the reason for using sample manufacturing companies because it is 
the most dominant industry type listed in Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX), so it is 
expected will also vary the behavior of tax avoidance. 
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Table1 
Sample Selection 
 
Firm – Year Firm 
Manufacturing firms listed on the Stock Exchange by August 
2015 560 140 
Less:   
-Not using IDR (Indonesian Rupiah Currency) (32) (8) 
-Not using the fiscal year ended on December 31 (56) (14) 
-Incomplete data from the years 2011-2014 (204) (51) 
Total Sample Observation 268 67 
 
Variable Measurement and Regression Model 
The main model of data analysis used in this study is Estimated Generalized Least 
Square (EGLS) with Fixed Effect Model method that uses panel data which combines 
cross-section data and time series. To test hypothesis H1 and H2, the regression model 
is as follows: 
 
𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐾𝑀𝐺𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐾𝑀𝐺𝑇𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝐹𝐴𝑀𝐼𝐿𝑌𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽5𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐶𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡 
 
Management compensation variable (𝐾𝑀𝐺𝑇𝑖𝑡) in this research is calculated with 
natural logaritm of amount compensation received by the board of directors and board 
of commissionners of the year refers to Armstrong et al. (2012). Data used to the 
measurement of management compensation can be found in the company's annual 
reports and processed by hand collected. 
Wang (2006) stated that generally, the family company put family members or 
representatives in strategic positions, it is generally following the characteristics of the 
family company in Indonesia. Therefore, the proxy for family ownership 
(𝐷𝐹𝐴𝑀𝐼𝐿𝑌𝑖𝑡) used in this study refers to Wang (2006) is 1 if the chief executive 
(CEO) of the company is Owner or relative of the founding family of the company 
(affiliated) whose shareholding is less than 5%, and 0 otherwise. Data used to the 
measurement of family ownership can be found in the company's annual reports and 
processed by hand collected. 
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Tax Avoidance (𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡)variable is measured with improvements to previous 
research by measuring tax avoidance using book-tax differences (BTDs) following 
Tang and Firth models (2008), the most popular tax planning measurement regarding 
reducing taxes and maximizing time value of money. Data used to the measurement of 
tax avoidance can be found in the company's financial reports and processed by hand 
collected. 
The control variables used in this research are firm characteristics that viewed 
based on firm size (𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡), leverage (𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡), return on asset (𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡), company 
growth (𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻𝑖𝑡), capital intensity (𝐶𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡) and inventory intensity (𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡). 
Stickney and McGee (1982) in Phillips (2003) found that capital intensity and 
inventory intensity had a positive effect on tax avoidance through the acceleration of 
asset costs based on the economic age of fixed assets. The data used to calculate the 
various control variables above is contained in the Financial Statement. 
 
4. Results 
4.1 Descriptive Statististics 
Based on Table 2 illustrates the descriptive statistics showed that book tax 
differences(𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡) of 0.05 with a standard deviation of 0.06. This means that the 
average manufacturing firms in Indonesia tend to avoid income raising taxes. The 
amount of compensation management(𝐾𝑀𝐺𝑇𝑖𝑡) adopted a minimum of 0.17 billion, 
with a maximum value of 3.31 billion. This indicates that the amount of compensation 
packages provided by the company is relatively large and varied. 
The average family ownership (𝐷𝐹𝐴𝑀𝐼𝐿𝑌𝑖𝑡) of 64% of the total observational 
sample with a standard deviation of 0.48. This shows that most of the manufacturing 
companies in Indonesia are the majority of family ownership. The average size of the 
company 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 of 21.74 trillion with a minimum value of 17.49 trillion and a 
maximum value of 25.16 trillion with a standard deviation of 1.46 indicates that the 
size of the company amount is quite varied. 
Return on asset (𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡)of the average sample company is 0.08, and it means that 
the company's profitability level is positive, it shows that the sample company's 
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performance is quite good. Then the average corporate leverage ratio (𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡)of 0.56 
indicates that the proportion of debt is quite balanced with its capital structure, and the 
company's growth (𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻𝑖𝑡)averages by 0,00 indicating the average of sample 
firms are barely experiencing growth. Finally, the percentage of inventories 
intensity(𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡)and capital intensity (𝐶𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡) respectively by 47% and 16% of the 
assets owned by the company. 
Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
Dependent and 
Independent 
Variable 
 
 
    
 N Mean Median Maksimum Minimum Std.Dev 
TA 268 0,05 0,03 0,49 0,00 0,06 
KMGT 268 0,17 0,06 3,31 0,01 0,42 
DFAMILY 268 0,64 1,00 1,00 0,00 0,48 
  
Control Variable       
SIZE 268 21,74 21,67 25,16 17,49 1,46 
𝑅𝑂𝐴 268 0,08 0,09 0,60 -0,41 0,10 
𝐿𝐸𝑉 268 0,56 0,53 3,24 0,04 0,32 
𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻 268 0,00 0,00 0,16 -0,74 0,05 
𝐶𝐼𝑁𝑇 268 0,47 0,46 0,96 0,01 0,25 
𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐼𝑁𝑇 268 0,16 0,13 0,66 0,00 0,15 
TAit = Differences in fiscal and commercial income with book-tax differences models, 
firm i in year t, KMGTit= natural logarithm of amount compensation received by the 
board of directors and board of commissioners firm i in year t, DFAMILYit=1 if chief 
executive (CEO) of the company is Owner or relative of the founding family of the 
company (affiliated) whose shareholding is less than 5%, and 0 otherwise, SIZEit= 
natural logarithm total assets of firm i in year t,, ROAit= ratio of net income and total 
assets of firm i in year t, GROWTHit= Growth Companies as measured from the market 
to book ratio of firm i in year t, LEVit= ratio of total liabilities and total assets of firm i 
in year t, CINTit= ratio of total fixed assets and total assets of company i in year t, 
danINVINTit= ratio of total inventory intensity and total assets of firm i in year t. 
Signs ***, ** and * indicate significance level 0,01, 0,05, and 0,10 (one-tailed) 
4.2 Empirical Research Findings 
Table 3 shows that hypothesis 1 is accepted, the management compensation 
variable (KMGT) is significant at the 1% significance level with a negative coefficient 
of -0.03. These results are consistent with Armstrong et al. (2012), and Robinson et al. 
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(2010) found that management compensation had a negative effect on tax evasion. The 
evidence shows that higher compensation given to management will further lower tax 
avoidance. It means that companies in Indonesia tend to be concerned about the legal 
risks that arise when doing aggressive tax avoidance that companies use the 
compensation mechanism to close the opportunist decisions in the management of tax 
evasion so expect the company to avoid risks that may arise in the future. 
However, basically, the company is not only responsible for the owner, but also 
should be responsible to the stakeholders who have an interest in the activities of the 
company. Therefore, all companies in Indonesia must fulfill their obligations to the 
government by obediently paying taxes and complying with all applicable rules. In the 
article 17A and 17B, KUP states that the Directorate General of Taxation (DJP) is 
obliged to conduct an examination of taxes Nil and tax overpaid companies (tax 
compensation). Inspections conducted by tax officials are often considered to pose a 
risk to the company because the examination process will certainly take up a lot of 
time, cost, energy and not to mention the possibility of the company will be exposed 
to legal problems if tax fiscal found new evidence that would harm the company. So 
many companies will still pay taxes even though they are losing money to avoid the 
inspection process. 
Also, hypothesis 2 testing suggests that if there is a representative of the founding 
family as the company's chief executive, it can strengthen the negative influence of 
management compensation on tax avoidance. The result in table 3 shows that family 
ownership variable (DFAMILY) is significant at 1% level, but the positive coefficient 
is 0.02 with meaning that if family ownerships can weaken the negative effect of 
management compensation to tax avoidance, so it can be said that hypothesis 2 is 
rejected. 
This result is inconsistent with the findings several prior research such as 
Baderther et al., (2013) and Chen et al. (2010) state that family firms are less likely to 
adverse tax avoidance. However, this evidence suggests that family firms are more 
opportunistic in avoiding taxes (Mills and Newberry, 2001; Hanlon et al., 2005). Fan 
and Wong (2002) stated that under the weak legal regime conditions that occur in East 
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Asian countries, family firms are more likely to have poor earnings quality and are not 
transparent in disclosure of their financial statements. So it can be said that family 
companies in the region of East Asian countries tend to be more opportunistic to avoid 
taxes.  
In the case of Indonesia, it’s evident that tax avoidance scandals are committed by 
family firms such as Asian Agri Group and Bumi Resources. Asian Agri Group is a 
company owned by Tanoto Sukanto family, while Bumi Resources is owned company 
of Bakrie’s family. Both companies are proven to avoid taxes that could potentially 
cause state losses of 1.295 trillion and 376 billion rupiahs (Dharmasaputra, 2013). 
Finally, Can be said that the weak tax rules in Indonesia open the opportunity for 
family companies to take advantage of the gap of the tax rules, in addition to the cost 
of tax avoidance can be quite low compared to the benefits that may result from tax 
avoidance activities due to lack of oversight of the company, not strictly legal 
sanctions for Companies that avoid taxes and low awareness of taxpayers to pay taxes. 
Therefore, it is important for regulators to improve the tax regulation so that the rules 
are not many loopholes, enforcing strict sanctions on companies that are proven to 
avoid taxes, and providing education and socialization in generating taxpayer 
compliance to pay taxes and save the State from the potential loss of tax avoidance. 
 
5. Conclusion, Implication, and Limitation 
This study aims to provide empirical evidence related to the effect of management 
compensation on corporate tax avoidance, then also illustrates how the role of 
moderation variable of family ownership to the relationship between management 
compensation and tax avoidance at manufacturing companies listed in Indonesia Stock 
Exchange (IDX). Based on the test results can be concluded that management 
compensation can be used by the owners to reduce tax avoidance. If the higher the 
compensation was given to the management, it could further lower the corporate tax 
avoidance. 
Also, this study proves that if the company is family ownership illustrated by a 
founding family representative in a key management company will further weaken the 
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negative influence between management compensation and corporate tax avoidance. 
This can happen because family firms in Indonesia tend to have a poor quality of 
profit and not transparent, so it can be a concern for the tax authorities to supervise 
better the company, especially family companies because it is more likely to do tax 
evasion.  
In this study, there are several limitations of the study to note that further research 
can fix these limitations. First, this study only measures compensated by the natural 
logarithm of the total amount of compensation provided to management without 
considering how the size of the board in a company that can also affect the amount of 
compensation issued by the company. Second, the measurement of family ownership 
using dummy variables, the company is assumed as family ownership if the chief 
executive (CEO) is the owner or relative of the owner, some companies have not so 
clear the ownership information, consequently the company may not be identified 
because of the limited information. 
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Table 3 
Results of Hypothesis Testing 
 
Independent Variable 
 Dependent Variable 
Sign 
Book Tax Differences 
(TA) 
Intercept  0,17*** 
KMGT 
 
- 
(8,20) 
-0,03*** 
  (-2,99) 
   
KMGT*DFAMILY 
 
- 0,02*** 
(2,66)  
 
Variabel Kontrol 
 
 SIZE - -0,01*** 
 
 (-7,44) 
ROA + 0,04* 
  (1,91) 
LEV + 0,05*** 
  (8,08) 
GROWTH - -0,01 
  (-0,82) 
CINT + -0,01 
 INVINT 
 
 
- 
(-1,12) 
-0,05*** 
(-5,21) 
R-squared  0,39 
Adjusted R-squared  0,37 
F-Statistic  20,43 
Prob (F-Stat)  0.00 
Durbin-Watson Stat  1,21 
# Observasi  268 
# Emiten Manufaktur  67 
TAit = Tax avoidance firm i in year t as measured by abnormal BTD, KMGTit= 
Compensation management firm i in year t, DFAMILYit= dummy family ownership firm i 
in year t: 1 if the chief executive (CEO) is the owner or a relative of the family of the 
founder of the company (affiliated); 0 otherwise, SIZEit= natural logarithm total assets of 
firm i in year t,, ROAit= ratio of net income and total assets of firm i in year t, GROWTHit= 
Growth Companies as measured from the market to book ratio of firm i in year t, LEVit= 
ratio of total liabilities and total assets of firm i in year t, CINTit= ratio of total fixed assets 
and total assets of company i in year t, danINVINTit= ratio of of total inventory intensity 
and total assets of firm i in year t. Signs ***, ** and * indicate significance level 0,01, 
0,05, and 0,10 (one-tailed). 
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